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ABSTRACT 
Black hole or packet drop attack is a denial of service attack on routing protocols in which malicious nodes 
fabricate routing information, attract packets routed through them and then deliberately drop these packets. 
Most of the black hole attack simulations are performed by constantly fabricating routing information and 
thus consistently attracting packets to them, which can be easily detected by the intrusion detection system. 
In this study, a complicated and difficult to detect black hole attack is proposed. The malicious nodes only 
perform packet drop when they are in the advantageous positions or locations in the networks. This study 
investigates the impact of the proposed black hole attack performed by random as well as critical nodes, to 
the network performance. Critical nodes are nodes that reside along the most active traffic paths and results 
show that the attacks performed by these nodes cause significant damage to the networks or substantial 
reduction in packet delivery ratio in comparison to that of random nodes.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile  ad  hoc  networks,  also  known  as  MANETs 
have been proven beneficial in many application areas. 
Due to their unique  network characteristics,  they  have 
been  deployed  in  many  networks  including  the  army 
tactical networks, battlefield surveillance networks, post-
disaster  emergency  networks,  environment  and  habitat 
monitoring networks and traffic control networks. 
MANET  consists  of  mobile,  tiny,  low-powered 
battery  devices  with  limited  processing  and  storage 
resources.  Being  an  ad  hoc  network,  MANET  is  an 
infrastructure-less network whereby the communication 
among the nodes is done through multi-hop that is the 
neighboring nodes forward the data for the sender if the 
destination is not within the sender’s transmission range. 
In other words, each mobile node in the networks acts as 
both a router and a host. Communication of multi-hop 
wireless  networks  however  has  its  own  disadvantages, 
which  includes  being  susceptible  to  many  attacks.  In 
particular,  the  networks  can  easily  be  crippled  by  the 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, such as the infamous 
black hole or packet drop attack. 
Many  researchers  have  simulated  black  hole 
attacks in their works and provided detection and/or 
prevention  mechanisms  as  well  (Yerneni  and  Sarje, 
2012;  Thachil  and  Shet,  2012;  Osathanunkul  and 
Zhang, 2011; Kurosawa et al., 2007). However, most of 
the black hole attacks simulations have been carried out 
by  randomly  assigned  some  nodes  as  the  attackers.  In 
addition,  the  attackers  consistently  fabricate  routing 
information  and  thus  attract  all  packets  to  them.  Such 
behavior can be easily detected by the Intrusion Detection 
System  (IDS).  We  propose  a  more  complicated  black 
hole  attack.  The  attacks  are  only  performed  when  the 
nodes  are  in  the  advantageous  positions  or  locations 
within the networks. Thus, with such intermittent attacks, 
the  traditional  IDS  may  not  be  able  to  detect  such 
behaviors easily. In this study, we simulate such attacks 
in  two  different  scenarios,  with  randomly  distributed Raja Azlina Raja Mahmood et al. / Journal of Computer Science 9 (12): 1722-1733, 2013 
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attackers as well as with selectively distributed attackers 
and  study  the  impact  of  the  attacks  to  the  network 
performances. We define randomly distributed attackers 
as  nodes  that  are  randomly  chosen  to  be  attackers 
regardless of their positions or locations in the networks. 
Meanwhile, the selectively distributed attackers are nodes 
that  reside  along  the  most  active  traffic  within  the 
networks.  Some  packet  loss  activities  are  expected  in 
both scenarios but major packet loss, thus significantly 
degrade  the  performance  of  the  networks,  can  be 
anticipated from the selectively distributed attackers.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows. In the 
following subsections, we discuss some of the attacks in 
MANETs  with  detailed  explanation  on  the  black  hole 
attacks, some of the related works on simulating the black 
hole attacks and the implementation of the proposed black 
hole attacks. In section 2, we describe the parameters used 
in the experiments. In section 3, we present the simulation 
results of attack-free networks, as well as networks with 
effective black hole attacks by random nodes and critical 
nodes. Section 4 discusses the simulations findings and we 
conclude the work in section 5. 
1.1. Attacks in MANETS 
Table  1  shows  some  of  the  attacks  in  MANETs, 
based on protocol stacks. The attackers are known by few 
names, namely malicious, selfish and misbehaving nodes. 
The nodes that attack with the intention of bringing down 
the  network,  such  as  by  performing  Denial  of  Service 
(DoS)  attack  are  called  malicious  nodes.  Meanwhile 
selfish nodes are those that optimize their own gain and 
neglect the welfare of other nodes, such as by dropping 
other  nodes’  packets  in  order  to  conserve  their  own 
energy. These nodes are sometimes called misbehaving 
nodes, as they are not being cooperative or do not follow 
the protocols specifications.  
Network layer or routing attacks are the current attack 
trends  been  heavily  studied.  Among  ad  hoc  routing 
protocols,  the  reactive  Ad  Hoc  On-Demand  Distance 
Vector (AODV) (Perkins and Royer, 1999) and Dynamic 
Source  Routing  (DSR)  (Johnson  and  Maltz,  1996) 
protocols are the most widely deployed. In response to 
any link breakage or changes in the network topology, the 
protocols  perform  route  discovery  to  quickly  find 
alternative  routes. The  source  node  floods  the  network 
with control messages known as Route Request (RREQ) 
and expects a Route Reply (RREP) packet in return. In 
AODV, the intermediate nodes with the best path value to 
the  destination  node  will  respond  to  the  source  node. 
Since  our  work  will  be  focusing  on  AODV  routing 
protocol, we will only include detailed explanation of its 
route discovery, as depicted in Fig. 1. 
In order for node Src to send packets to node Dst, it 
has to generate a RREQ message and broadcast it to its 
neighbors, in this case, A, C and D. The RREQ contains 
the last known destination sequence number, in this case 
the  Dst  sequence  number.  The  destination  sequence 
number  is  an  important  attribute  in  RREQ  that 
determines the freshness of a particular route. Thus, if 
any of the neighboring nodes has a fresh enough route to 
Dst,  it  will  send  a  RREP  message  to  Src.  On  the 
contrary, in case where it does not have a fresh enough 
route  to  Dst,  it  will  forward  the  RREQ  packet  to  its 
neighbours and this activity is repeated until the packet 
reaches  Dst.  When  Dst  receives  the  RREQ  packet,  it 
sends a RREP packet to Src. When node Src receives the 
RREP, a route is established. In case where Src receives 
multiple RREP messages, it will select the message with 
the largest destination sequence number value. 
1.1.1. Black Hole Attacks 
Black  hole  attack  is  also  known  as  packet  drop  as 
well  as  sequence  number  attack.  This  attack  is  easily 
implemented  in  AODV  during  the  route  discovery 
process. In this attack, a malicious node advertises itself 
as having the shortest path to the destination node and 
thus will be selected against other nodes to forward the 
packets for the sender. In specific, the attacker forges its 
destination sequence number by having a relatively high 
destination sequence number, thus pretending to have the 
fresh  enough  route  to  destination.  In  general 
implementation, the legitimate node with the shortest path 
to the destination would increase its destination sequence 
number’s value by 1, but the attacker would increase its 
destination  sequence  number’s  value  by  a  large  value, 
such  as  10.  Thus,  this  attacking  node  will  then  be  in 
favored against others and once the forged route has been 
established, it becomes a member of the active route and 
intercepts the communicating packets. The attacker then 
drops all of the incoming packets routed through it and 
thus creates a black hole in the networks. 
Alternatively, the attacker may choose to drop only 
selected  incoming  packets  routed  through  it.  In 
accomplishing the attack selectively, the malicious node 
only drop the packets based on certain criteria such as for 
a particular destination, at the certain time, a packet for 
every n packets or every t seconds, or randomly selected 
portion of the packets. Such attack is known as a gray 
hole attack and it is more difficult to detect in comparison 
to  dropping  all  packets  that  come  in.  As  mentioned 
earlier, the black hole attack is a type of DoS attack and 
thus, can be used as the first step to the man-in-middle 
attack,  where  the  malicious  node  may  monitor,  delay, 
delete or manipulate the data packets. Raja Azlina Raja Mahmood et al. / Journal of Computer Science 9 (12): 1722-1733, 2013 
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Fig. 1. An AODV discovery process 
 
Table 1. Security attacks on MANET protocol stacks (Wu et al., 2010) 
Layer  Attacks 
Application layer  repudiation, data corruption 
Transport layer  session hijacking, SYN flooding 
Network layer  wormhole, black hole, Byzantine, flooding, resource consumption, location disclosure attacks 
Link layer  traffic analysis, monitoring, disruption MAC, WEP weakness 
Physical layer  jamming, interceptions, eavesdropping 
Multi-layer  DoS, impersonation, replay, man-in-the-middle 
 
1.1.2. Attack Detection Metric  
The presence of the black hole or packet drop attacks 
in the  networks  is  generally  determined by  the Packet 
Delivery  Ratio  (PDR)  value.  It  is  one  of  the  most 
common  metrics  used to evaluate the performances of 
the  routing  protocols,  among  other  metrics  including 
throughput,  end-to-end  delay,  overheads  and  jitter  as 
reported by Broch et al. (1998). The PDR is calculated as 
follows Equation (1): 
  
 received packets at application layer
PDR
sent packets at application layer
∑
=
∑
   (1) 
 
Thus with the black hole or packet drop attacks in the 
networks,  the  PDR  percentage  should  have  been 
deteriorated. The decreasing of the percentage of PDR 
somehow varies due to different parameter settings, such 
as  random  node  movements  and  different  source-
destination  established  connections.  Next  section 
discusses  in  details  few  of  the  black  hole  attacks 
implementations,  detection  methods  as  well  as 
prevention methods using NS2. 
1.2. Related Works  
Yerneni  and  Sarje  (2012)  implemented  a  secure 
AODV,  known  as  Opinion  AODV  (OAODV)  and 
compared its PDR result against that of the traditional 
AODV  within  the  under-attack  networks.  They 
simulated 20 to 50 mobile nodes under various speeds, 
from 5 to 40 m sec
-1 for 50 sec. However no specific 
information on the black hole attack implementation has 
been provided, including number of attackers and how 
they have been selected. The results however shown that 
with  black  hole  attacks  within  the  normal  AODV 
networks,  the  PDR  has  been  significantly  reduced  to 
between  5  to  30%  only.  Meanwhile,  the  proposed 
method is able to thwart the attacks effectively with its 
high  PDR  resulting  value  ranging  from  60  to  80%. 
With no details given on the number of attackers, we do 
not  know  the  percentage  of  attackers  within  the 
networks. We could only assume that the attackers are 
randomly  selected  and  the  impact  of  the  attacker  or 
attackers to the networks is based on the PDR results 
given. With limited information, no correlation between 
the packet drop percentage and number of attackers in 
the networks can be made. In this study, the simulation 
was  performed  for  the  duration  of  50  sec.  The 
disadvantage of having a short simulation time however 
is that many source-to-destination connections may not 
get properly established when the simulation ends or in 
other  words,  the  network  has  not  reached  its  stable 
state.  This  could  contribute  to  low  PDR  percentage 
within the network due to a number of data packets that Raja Azlina Raja Mahmood et al. / Journal of Computer Science 9 (12): 1722-1733, 2013 
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have not been received by the destination nodes when 
the 50 sec simulation time ends. 
Thachil  and  Shet  (2012)  proposed  a  trust  based 
approach  to  mitigate  black  hole  attack  in  MANETs. 
They  simulated  50  mobile  nodes  with  speed  of  20  m 
sec
-1 for 500 milliseconds and 1000 milliseconds. They 
deployed different number of malicious nodes, from 1 to 
25  nodes  or  up  to  50%  of  the  network  population. 
However,  no  detailed  explanation  is  given  on  the 
attackers’ selection and thus can be assumed randomly 
selected.  As  expected,  with  more  attackers  in  the 
networks, the PDR value deteriorates even reaching 0% 
or  collapsing  the  whole  normal  AODV  network  when 
there  are  5  or  more  collaborative  attackers  in  the 
networks.  Their  proposed  method  however  is  able  to 
mitigate  the  attacks  effectively  and  thus,  causes 
minimal  damage  to  the  networks.  The  graph  shows 
considerable  reduction  of  PDR  value  when  the 
proposed method was employed, that is the PDR value 
maintains at 80% when there are 5 malicious nodes and 
deteriorates afterwards to the lowest of 70% for 1000 
milliseconds simulation time and to the lowest of 30% 
for network with simulation time of 500 milliseconds. 
Similar to Yerneni and Sarje (2012), this work has been 
simulated  within  a  short  span  time,  thus  may  have 
suffered from the abovementioned effect. 
Osathanunkul  and  Zhang  (2011)  present  a  solution 
called Secure Expected Transmission Count (SETX) to 
counter  black  hole  attack.  They  simulated  50  to  100 
nodes with speed of 5 m sec
-1 for 50 sec. They deployed 
1 to 10 malicious nodes and studied the network PDR 
value  respectively.  As  expected,  the  PDR  steadily 
reaching 0% when there are 3 or more attackers in the 
traditional  MANETs.  Their  method  has  significantly 
improved  the  network  performance  with  the  resulting 
PDR value ranges from 60 to 10% for the network of 
size 50. Meanwhile, in the network of bigger size, that is 
size 100 nodes, the PDR performance is better, ranges 
from 70% to the lowest of 25%. It can be concluded that 
with higher percentage of attackers within the network, 
the packet drop percentage increases. This explains why 
10  attackers  within  network  of  50  nodes  are  more 
harmful than having 10 attackers within network of 100 
nodes, assuming that all the attackers are of the same 
capability.  Similar  to  Yerneni  and  Sarje  (2012)  and 
Thachil and Shet (2012), the simulation time undertaken 
in this work is considerably short and thus also may have 
suffered from the abovementioned effect. It is worth to 
mention that the common simulation time used by the 
highly  cited  research  works  in  studying  the 
performances  of  MANETs  with  attacks  presence, 
including  Huang  et  al.  (2003);  Stamouli  et  al.  (2005) 
and Kurosawa et al. (2007) is 900 sec or longer. All of 
the abovementioned highly cited works are following the 
work of the pioneers in MANETs (Broch et al., 1998). 
The implementation of black hole attacks in these 
discussed  works is performed in such a  way that the 
malicious  nodes  always  fabricate  routing  information 
and  thus  always  attract  packets  to  them.  Thus,  it 
explains the collapsed network even with the presence 
of only 5 attackers in a 50- node network as reported by 
Thachil  and  Shet  (2012)  and  with  the  presence  of  3 
attackers in 50- and 100- node networks as reported by 
Osathanunkul and Zhang (2011) within a short period 
of  time.  However,  we  take  a  different  approach. The 
next  section  discusses  our  implementation  of  the 
proposed black hole attack in details.  
1.3. Effective Black Hole Attacks 
We  propose  a  more  complicated  and  difficult  to 
detect black hole attack. In particular, the fabrication of 
the  routing  information  activity  undertaken  by  the 
malicious nodes is intentionally made inconsistent, that 
is to avoid detection. Nodes that attract data packets all 
the  time  are  easier  to  be  detected  by  the  IDS  in 
comparison to nodes that attract packets intermittently. 
In our implementation, the nodes will only fabricate the 
routing information when they are at the appropriate or 
advantageous  locations,  such  as  they  are  legitimately 
within  the  paths  of  the  forwarded  packets.  This  is  to 
prevent  the  nodes  from  being  detected  by  intelligent 
agent or sensor that may have studied the location of the 
nodes  that  respond  to  have  the  shortest  path  to  the 
destination. Similar detection method has been proposed 
earlier by Lee et al. (2008), but in the case of mitigating 
wormhole  attack.  They  proposed  each  node  gathers 
information  of  its  neighbors  within  two  hops.  That  is 
each  newly  joined  node  broadcasts  an  announcement, 
which is valid only within the next two hops. Although 
the  method  is  capable  of  preventing  the  attacks,  the 
requirement of maintaining two hops neighbors, keyed 
hash  and  TTL  however  limit  the  applicability  of  this 
method in a distributed system where there exists a wide 
variety of participants. Thus, similar detection technique 
may  also  be  proposed  to  detect  black  hole  attacks,  in 
which the sensor is to gather information of the nodes 
within the destined traffic paths and thus the malicious 
nodes  may  be  punished  if  they  are  not  within  these 
legitimate  paths  or  in  other  words  detected  for 
fabricating the routing information. Raja Azlina Raja Mahmood et al. / Journal of Computer Science 9 (12): 1722-1733, 2013 
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Fig. 2. MANET of 18 nodes with n5, n8, n9, n12 and n13 overlapping nodes 
 
In our implementation, malicious nodes only fabricate 
routing  information  when  they  are  at  appropriate 
locations,  which  are  within  the  destined  traffic  paths. 
Intermittent  attacks  or  sporadic  packet  loss  is  more 
difficult to detect than the consistent attacks. We simulate 
such  effective  attacks  in  two  different  scenarios,  with 
attackers  that  are  randomly  distributed  as  well  as  with 
selectively  distributed  attackers.  We  define  randomly 
distributed attackers as nodes that are randomly chosen to 
be attackers regardless of their positions or locations in 
the  networks.  Meanwhile,  the  selectively  distributed 
attackers are nodes that are located along the most active 
traffics within the networks. The nodes that reside along 
the most active paths are called critical nodes, in which 
any disruption, in this case packet drop by these nodes 
may  significantly  degrade  the  performance  of  the 
networks. Thus black hole attacks by these critical nodes 
are expected to cause major damage to the networks, yet 
difficult to detect due to the intermittent attacks. 
Overlapping  nodes,  as  shown  in  Fig.  2  are  good 
candidates for critical nodes as they are responsible to 
forward  packets  from  one  cluster  or  one  transmission 
range to another. Critical nodes have also been discussed 
by  other  researchers,  especially  in  identifying  critical 
nodes within the networks. 
It  is  worth  to  mention  that  identifying  critical  nodes 
within MANETs is a  highly  challenging  task.  Given  the 
time delays of the diagnostic packet, the  mobility of the 
nodes  and  the  limited  processing  resources  makes 
determining  the  global  network  topology  process  seems 
impossible.  Thus,  many  resort  to  approximating  the 
network  topology,  which  is  also  able  to  provide  useful 
information such as the network density, network mobility, 
critical  paths  and  thus,  critical  nodes  in  the  networks. 
Karygiannis et al. (2006) approximate the global network 
topology by employing a graph theoretic approach as well 
as  deploying  network  discovery  algorithm.  Meanwhile, 
Shivashankar  and  Varaprasad  (2012)  identified  critical 
nodes  in  MANETs  based  on  residual  battery  power, 
reliability, bandwidth, availability and service traffic type. 
In this study, we simulate attack-free networks and then 
analyze the enormous traffic information to determine the 
network topology at certain given time. We then identify 
the critical  nodes by  focusing on the nodes that  forward 
packets the most during the simulation period. This study 
aims to investigate the impact of the effective black hole 
attacks  performed  by  randomly  located  nodes  as  well 
critical  nodes to  the  network performances, in terms of 
PDR and packet drop percentage. Next section discusses 
the simulation works in details. 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
We  simulate  a  condense  MANET  with  50  nodes 
within  a  field  size  of  1500×300m  using  NS2.  The 
parameters for the simulations are given in Table 2. The 
nodes will move within the network space according to 
the  random  waypoint  mobility  model,  in  which  each 
node will move to a random location within the specified 
network  area.  Once  the  node  arrived  at  the  target 
location, it will remain in that position for a specified 
time,  in  this  case  the  pause  time,  before  moving  to 
another random location. In our simulation, we have set 
multiple  pause  time,  ranging  from  0  s  pause  (high 
mobility) to 900 s pause (static), to study the nodes and 
networks behaviors under different stopping time. Raja Azlina Raja Mahmood et al. / Journal of Computer Science 9 (12): 1722-1733, 2013 
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Table 2. Simulation parameters 
Parameters  Values 
Simulation Time  900 sec 
Number of mobile nodes  50 
Topology  1500×300 m 
Mobility Model  Random waypoint 
Transmission Range  250 m 
Routing Protocol  AODV 
Maximum Bandwidth  2 Mbps 
Traffic  Constant bit rate 
Number of Traffic Sources  20 
Packet size  64 bytes 
Packet rate  4 packets sec
-1 
Speeds  5, 15, 20 m sec
-1 
Pause Times  900, 600, 300, 120, 60, 30, 0 s 
 
The  communication  patterns  deployed  is  the  Constant 
Bit Rate (CBR) connection with a data rate of 4 packets 
per second with each packet of 64 bytes in size and 20 
connections  are  established  at  random.  We  also  set 
multiple movement speeds for the nodes, with the speed 
of 5 m sec
-1 is to simulate people jog, 15 m sec
-1 is to 
simulate a slow-speed moving car and 20 m sec
-1 is to 
simulate a car of a high speed. 
3. RESULTS 
3.1. Attack-Free Networks 
In  the  attack-free  networks  we  discuss  the 
performance of its PDR under different speed rates of 
different pause times. In general, as the speed of the node 
increases and with high mobility (pause 0, 30 and 60), 
the PDR percentage degrades as more path links break due 
to  the  node  movement  and  finally  lead  to  high  packet 
drops. Figure 3 shows the overall PDR performance for 
the attack-free networks, with all of the PDR percentage 
are above 95%, as AODV quickly finds alternative routes 
whenever there are broken paths. Within the attack-free 
networks, we have observed the packets drop percentage 
is  very  minimal,  such  that  the  percentage  of  packet 
delivery ranges from the lowest of 94.9% to the highest 
of 99.5% with the average percentage value of 96.8%. 
Many works have shown similar PDR results and thus 
we  can  safely  assume  that  95%  is  the  PDR  threshold 
value  for  MANETs  with  standard  routing  protocol 
implementation,  that  is  without  any  packet  dropping 
attacks  (Yerneni  and  Sarje,  2012;  Thachil  and  Shet, 
2012; Osathanunkul and Zhang, 2011; Kurosawa et al., 
2007; Stamouli et al., 2005). Thus, with packet drop attacks 
in  the  networks,  we  expect  a  significant  performance 
degradation, that is much lower PDR percentage. 
3.2. Networks with Random Attackers 
In this study, we have selected 5 random nodes as 
the  attackers,  even  before  analyzing  the  forwarding 
table of the networks. These nodes will only perform 
the black hole attacks when they are within the destined 
traffics. We have chosen nodes 5, 10, 15, 25 and 35 to 
be  the  attackers.  Due  to  the  extensive  processing 
resources required to analyze the huge trace files, we 
have  limited  the  study  to  the  following  pause  times 
only:  pause  0  (high  mobility),  pause  60  and  120 
(medium mobility), pause 300 (low mobility) and 900 
(static). The results  of  the  network  performance  with 
random node attackers are as shown in Fig. 4. 
As  expected,  Fig.  4  shows  network  performance 
degradation, with significant degradation in some cases, 
in comparison to those in the attack-free MANETs due 
to  the  deliberate  dropping  activity  by  the  attacking 
nodes. With the presence of black hole attacks, the PDR 
value has dropped, even significantly reduced to 47% for 
traffic of speed 20 m sec
-1, with pause at 900 sec. Based 
on  the  results  obtained  from  the  attack-free  MANETs 
(Fig. 3), it can be concluded that “unjustifiable” packet 
dropping activity has occurred whenever the PDR value 
is below the 95% threshold value. With random nodes 
been  chosen  as  the  attackers,  we  have  seen  that  the 
percentage of packet delivery ranges from 46.9 to 93.2% 
with  average  value  of  77.2%.  We  expect  even  lower 
percentage of PDR in the networks with critical nodes 
are chosen to be the attackers.  
3.3. Networks with Critical Nodes as Attackers 
In this section, we study the network performances 
when critical nodes are selected as the attackers. In order 
to  identify  the  critical  nodes,  we  studied  the  network 
topology of various speeds and various pause times. In 
particular, we identified 5 nodes that forwarded the most 
packets in the networks in every network scenario. These 
nodes will only perform the black hole attacks when they 
are within the destined traffics and since they are at the 
advantageous  positions  most  of  the  time,  they  will 
perform frequent packet drop. Table 3 shows the critical 
nodes of different speed and of different pause time in 
our  experiments.  It  also  shows  the  total  percentage  of 
networks  forwarded  by  these  critical  nodes.  The  PDR 
value  would  have  significantly  reduced  if  all  packets 
forwarded  to  these  critical  nodes  are  deliberately 
dropped.  In  specific,  the  network  would  have  been 
collapsed  when  more than  half of the network traffics 
have been dropped by these nodes at speed 5 m sec
-1 and 
pause time of 900 sec. Raja Azlina Raja Mahmood et al. / Journal of Computer Science 9 (12): 1722-1733, 2013 
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Fig. 3. Packet delivery ratio of attack-free MANETs 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Packet delivery ratio of MANETs with random attackers, node 5, 10, 15, 25 and 35 Raja Azlina Raja Mahmood et al. / Journal of Computer Science 9 (12): 1722-1733, 2013 
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Fig. 5. Packet delivery ratio of MANETs with critical nodes as attackers 
 
Table 3. Critical nodes of different network scenarios 
    Critical Nodes  Total percentage of forwarded 
Speed (m/s)  Pause time  (descending order)  packets in the networks (%) 
5  0  45, 31, 28, 42, 17  21.20 
  60  29, 32, 19, 27, 9  21.23 
  120  34, 16, 45, 3, 9  23.95 
  600  30, 3, 24, 14, 12  31.61 
  900  3, 19, 45, 48, 21  51.81 
15  0  17, 27, 10, 29, 16  19.89 
  60  4, 40, 17, 48, 19  18.93 
  120  36, 0, 4, 20, 10  20.27 
  600  2, 32, 4, 35, 16  31.96 
  900  31, 16, 18, 48, 10  48.29 
20  0  30, 34, 45, 25, 32  17.12 
  60  10, 19, 23, 45, 38  17.93 
  120  16, 36, 10, 9, 2  24.49 
  600  41, 15, 1, 42, 49  30.36 
  900  42, 29, 35, 34, 10  47.10 
 
From Table 3, we can conclude that the critical nodes 
vary from one network scenario to another. The mobility 
of the nodes, which act as routers at the same time to 
forward  neighboring  packets,  has  made  determining 
“universal” critical nodes impossible. Suffice to mention 
that from observation, some nodes appear few times in 
different scenarios such as nodes 3 and 9 in networks of 
speed 5 m sec
-1, nodes 4 and 10 in networks of speed 15 
m sec
-1 and nodes10, 42 and 45 in networks of 20  m 
sec
-1. This could only mean that these nodes are within 
the  active  paths  numerous  times,  thus  part  of  critical 
nodes  for  different  network  scenarios.  However,  it  is 
worth to mention that the reason for high packet drop 
percentage  in  the  network  with  random  attackers  of 
speed 20 m sec
-1, with pause at 900 sec is because one of 
the  random  attackers,  namely  node  10  is  part  of  the 
critical nodes (Table 3). Figure 5 shows the damage that 
these attackers have caused to the networks. Raja Azlina Raja Mahmood et al. / Journal of Computer Science 9 (12): 1722-1733, 2013 
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With critical nodes been chosen as the attackers, the 
percentage of packet drop in the networks has increased 
significantly,  ranges  from  the  lowest  of  33.6%  to  the 
highest  of  62.1%,  with  average  of  42.1%  packet 
dropping. Such high percentage of packet drop could 
definitely bring down the whole networks. Thus, the 
PDR value is significantly lower than those of random 
attackers, in which the percentage of packet delivery 
ranges only from 37.9 to 66.4% with average value of 
only 57.9%. The most devastating impact was at speed 
15  m  sec
-1  with  pause  time  of  900  sec,  whereby 
62.15%  of  the  packets  supposedly  to  be  forwarded 
have been dropped deliberately. This result shows that 
by choosing the attackers carefully, the impact can be 
overwhelmingly  dangerous  to  the  networks,  even 
though the attackers just made up 10% of the network 
population. Thus, the result has demonstrated that an 
effective black hole attack performed by the critical 
nodes causes significant damage in comparison to the 
damage  by  the  randomly  assigned  attackers.  More 
importantly,  due  to  the  intermittent  packet  drop 
activity within the networks, it is more difficult to be 
detected by the IDS. 
4. DISCUSSION 
Based on the PDR results shown in Fig. 4 and 5, we 
can conclude that having the critical nodes as attackers 
cause a devastating impact to the network performance, 
even catastrophic at times. On the contrary, the attacks 
by the random nodes have less devastating impacts to the 
networks, although at speed of 20 m sec
-1, with pause at 
900 sec, the PDR value has significantly dropped to only 
47%. This proves that the random nodes are part of the 
active  paths  for  that  particular  network  scenario. 
However,  if  the  randomly  chosen  attackers  are 
somehow not part of the active paths, the packet drop 
activity may only occur few times or even not taking 
place  at  all.  Figure  6  shows  the  packet  drop 
percentage  by  random  attackers  on  various  network 
scenarios.  In  particular,  within  the  speed  5  m  sec
-1 
network  scenarios,  the packet drop rate  ranges  from 
6.8  to  21.9%,  with  average  value  of  16.1%.  For 
network scenarios of speed 15 m sec
-1, the rate ranges 
from 14.9 to 32.4.9%, with average packet drop values 
of 22.3%. Finally, for network scenarios of speed 20 
m  sec
-1,  the  rate  ranges  from  20.7  to  32.4%,  with 
average  packet  drop  values  of  26%.  In  general,  on 
average, the packet drop rate is about 21.47% for each 
network  scenario  which  can  still  be  considered  as 
having less devastating effects to the networks. 
As mentioned earlier, attacks by critical nodes can be 
catastrophic.  The  total  network  could  collapse  if 
cooperative attacks are launched by the attackers such as 
the case of network with speed 15 m sec
-1 and pause 900 
sec  with  62.15%  packet  drop  rate  as  well  as  network 
with speed 20 m sec
-1 and pause 900 sec with 51.72% 
packet drop rate (Fig. 7), in which huge proportion of 
network traffics are within the attackers’ influence. 
Figure 7 shows high percentage of packet drop by 
the  critical  nodes  on  various  network  scenarios.  In 
general, on average, the packet drop rate is about 42.14% 
for each network scenario, which is double the rate of 
that of random nodes. In particular, within the speed 5 m 
sec
-1 network scenarios, the packet drop rate ranges from 
34.7 to 44.7%, with average value of 39.6%. For network 
scenarios of speed 15 m sec
-1, the rate ranges from 33.6 
to 62.19%, with average packet drop values of 45.7%. 
Finally, for network scenarios of speed 20 m sec
-1, the 
rate ranges from 33.6 to 51.7%, with average packet drop 
values  of  41.2%.  In  summary,  the  packet  drop 
percentages by the critical  nodes are about double the 
drop  percentages  by  the  random  nodes  and  thus  have 
more devastating impacts. 
In summary, we can conclude that the packet drop 
percentage  shown  by  both  random  and  critical 
attackers are between 5 and 62%. Unlike other works 
reported earlier, the packet drop percentage has never 
reached 100% even after the 900 sec simulation time 
ends. Yerneni and Sarje (2012) reported their PDR has 
been significantly reduced to only 5%, which means 
95% of packets have been dropped within that small 
span of time or 50 sec simulation time. Meanwhile as 
reported  by  Thachil  and  Shet  (2012),  their  resulting 
PDR  is  reduced  to  0%  or  in  other  words  100%  of 
packets  have  been  dropped,  when  there  were  5 
attackers  in  the  networks  within  the  short  500 
milliseconds  and  1000  milliseconds  of  simulation 
time.  Osathanunkul  and  Zhang  (2011) reported  their 
PDR reached 0% when 3 malicious nodes performed 
black hole attacks within the 50 sec simulation time. 
This shows that consistent packet drop activity within 
the network by the traditional black hole attacks could 
collapse the whole networks in short time. However, 
at the same time, such consistent packet drop behavior 
can be easily detected by IDS. Raja Azlina Raja Mahmood et al. / Journal of Computer Science 9 (12): 1722-1733, 2013 
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Fig. 6. Packet drop percentage by random attackers 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Packet drop percentage by critical nodes Raja Azlina Raja Mahmood et al. / Journal of Computer Science 9 (12): 1722-1733, 2013 
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In this preliminary study, we only consider the non-
real time network traffic information in MANETs. We 
investigate the damage done to the networks when the 
critical nodes are chosen as the attackers, in comparison 
to  the  randomly  chosen  attackers.  In  identifying  the 
critical  nodes,  we  analyzed  the  network  traffic 
information from the enormous NS2 trace files and chose 
5  nodes  that  forwarded  packets  the  most  in  various 
network scenarios. The forwarding table of each network 
scenario is huge and thus requires extensive resources to 
compute  the  packet  drop  percentage  of  different 
attackers.  For  instance,  in  analyzing  the  network 
topology of speed 20 m sec
-1 with pause 0sec, we have 
to deal with a 1977 MB size of trace file and have to 
traverse through 122,062 forwarding activities within the 
61,525  source-to-destination  paths  to  determine  if  the 
attackers are within the paths and thus to calculate the 
packet  drop.  In  average,  it  takes  about  6  to  8  h  to 
generate  the  packet  drop  percentage  results  for  one 
network scenario on a 2.3 Ghz Intel Core i5 processor 
with 4GB RAM machine. Thus, identifying the critical 
nodes in real-time is even more challenging. Due to the 
time delays of the diagnostic packets, the mobility of the 
nodes and the limited processing resources of nodes in 
MANETs,  such  attempts  can  be  considered  futile.  We 
hope the investigation of the network topology using the 
non-real time traffic information provides some basis of 
understanding  of  the  difficulties  in  dealing  with 
extensive  and  highly  dynamic  traffic  data  within 
resource-scarce wireless networks. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In  this  work,  we  implemented  effective  black  hole 
attacks using random nodes as well as critical nodes. We 
have shown that by choosing random nodes as attackers, 
the  damage  may  be  mild  or  less  significant  if  the 
attackers are not within the paths of most of the network 
traffics. On the contrary, selecting critical nodes as the 
attackers would significantly degrade the whole network 
performance and sometimes catastrophic. However, the 
packets  drop  percentage  shown  in  this  study  is 
considerably  low  in  comparison  to  that  of  discussed 
works that performed traditional black hole attacks. Our 
proposed  attack  is  more  complicated  and  difficult  to 
detect  due  to  the  intermittent  attacks  behaviors.  By 
studying  more complicated attacks behaviors, it  would 
help  in  devising  more  robust  and  effective  IDS.  In 
addition, understanding the significant of critical nodes 
in  the  networks  would  help  not  only  in  launching 
damaging attacks but also in the efforts to thwart such 
malicious attacks efficiently. For instance, implementing 
attacks prevention and detection mechanisms on critical 
nodes and not on all of the nodes in the networks may be 
cost  effective,  such  that  it  reduces  the  computational 
costs of these resource scarce networks. In future work, 
we plan to employ few detection algorithms on critical 
nodes  and  study  their  effectiveness  in  detecting  our 
proposed black hole attacks in MANETs. 
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